

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

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Chief of Station, Vienna

7 February 1951

Chief, Foreign Division M

Operational

Johann SANITZER

REFERENCE:

LSL-33

1. Two years ago, February 1949, a study was begun at Headquarters of the interrogation of Johann SANITZER, former head of Gestapo, Vienna, Section IV2, as contained in LSL-33. The purposes of the study were to be: a) utilization of the information contained in the interrogation on Soviet operational techniques in connection with our current operations, b) possibility of obtaining SANITZER's release from the Austrians in order that he could be interrogated in more detail on certain points which are not explained in LSL-33, c) possibility that SANITZER's experience in working against the SOVIET IS might be exploited. During the examination of LSL-33 certain captured German documents came to light which had never been read in connection with SANITZER. The documents proved to be translations from the German of the preliminary Vienna Gestapo interrogation of agents apprehended by SANITZER's men. Therefore it was contemplated forwarding resumes of the documents as Appendices to our study of LSL-33.

2. With work pressure in other fields steadily increasing, the SANITZER study was shelved in June 1949, when [redacted] informed us that the Soviets had abducted SANITZER from the Austrian prison and that nothing further was known of his fate. Subsequently we learned through the newspaper articles forwarded by you with MAVA-6342, MAVA-4717, that SANITZER was reportedly holding a post in the East German Police. Now, as you are aware, the German Station is interested in him and has requested information.

3. Both the Station and Headquarters are to blame for not having exploited the SANITZER lead or taking advantage of the man's experience and knowledge of the Soviet IS. We now have to face the fact that we allowed the SIS officer most experienced in running counter-espionage and double-agent operations against the Soviets to slip out of our hands with only a cursory interrogation, and may have to cope with the problem of countering operations which SANITZER may mount and run under Soviet direction against us. It is well to remember that SANITZER also apprehended American (JEREMY Mission of OSS), British and French agents. He is well aware that GROSS and SCHNEIDER were OSS agents, as pointed out in paragraph 3 of MAVA-4717. We therefore believe that the SANITZER materials and the information contained in the captured German documents retain their importance and have to be followed up in detail not only to protect ourselves against possible future SANITZER-directed

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operations, but as general background information on Soviet techniques, methods etc. in Austria. Your improved rapport with GREENGROCE/1 should be most helpful in the process.

4. SANITZER stated in ISX-33 that he had built up a comprehensive file on Austrian Communists, "Schutzbundkinder", etc. The file contained information on the relatives and families of the latter. Through a careful surveillance of the families, SANITZER identified and apprehended many of the agents. Hildegard KRAZ is an example. ISX-33 contains no information as to the fate of those files. They should have been - and may yet become - the "Bible" for our counter-intelligence and -espionage operations against the Soviets in Austria. The first target in our tardy exploitation of ISX-33, therefore, is to determine the existence and location of SANITZER's files.

5. The Austrians had SANITZER in custody from 1945 until 1949 at which time the Soviets abducted him. The Austrians, specifically GREENGROCE/1, must be aware of the preliminary interrogation conducted by the Americans. With SANITZER working for the Soviets, all objections to a discussion of the matter with GREENGROCE/1 have been eliminated. He should be thoroughly questioned regarding SANITZER's files and Austrian interrogation of SANITZER during the 1945-49 period. SANITZER's knowledge of Soviet operations in Austria during the last war is as valuable to GREENGROCE/1 as it is to us and he should be willing to cooperate with us in exploiting it, if he has not already done so for his own purposes.

6. This point is supported by a memo dated 24 May 1949 from [redacted] forwarded to headquarters in a batch of GREENGROCE/1 raw reports under [redacted] of 1 December 1950, which contains the following paragraph:

"Greengroce/1 thinks that the Soviet I.S. will employ SANITZER in an intelligence capacity if a shooting war starts between the East and the West. SANITZER specialized in D/A operations against the Soviets during the war. He was highly regarded by his superiors in the Gestapo for his success in controlling and playing back Soviet agents who operated with W/T sets in Austria. SANITZER was abducted from the prison at Stein during February (1949) by the Soviets."

7. There is no indication that the matter was pursued by the Station with GREENGROCE/1. In our opinion GREENGROCE/1 intended to give you an indication of SANITZER's importance for counter-espionage operations when he passed along that item. He also did not mention SANITZER, apparently, until the Soviets had abducted him. We therefore believe that some Austrian exploitation of SANITZER had taken place.

8. One of the first items to clear up with GREENGROCE/1 if your relations with him are sufficiently advanced, is the extent of British interest, past and present, in the whole case. SANITZER stated that two of the Soviet teams apprehended by him, KOEHLER/BORETSKY and MUTTARY/ZETTLER, had been trained in England and dropped from RAF planes. (Appendix E attached hereto describes this period of MUTTARY/ZETTLER's training in more detail.) ZETTLER stated that the British would not allow him to establish radio contact with Moscow unless he gave them his

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cipher. He claims that he did not do this. However, whether he did or didn't, there are two definite possibilities we must consider: a) the British brought the Soviet teams under control during the staging period in England; b) the British immediately checked into the agents' activities etc. upon occupation of Austria. LSX-33 also states that Major FAITHFUL of the BIS interrogated SANITZER on MAC CRANFORD, the British agent apprehended by SANITZER. (There is no indication that anyone from the SCI Unit A of OSS was present during the interrogation.) Finally, [redacted] stated that the British requested information from you some time ago and that they were provided with excerpts from LSX-33 on MAC CRANFORD. The above leads us to the conclusion that the British have been interested in SANITZER and probably investigated leads obtained from his operations. It is hoped that GREENGROVER/1 will be willing to provide you with detailed information on any action or interest on the part of the British.

9. The next step to be taken is to ascertain the whereabouts and activities of SANITZER's former staff of Section IV 2b (Funkabwehr) of Stapo Stelle Vienna as of March 1945. The personnel of that Section were the individuals concerned with SANITZER's double operations. Following is the list known to us, you may have more complete information:

a. Officer in Charge: Kriminalrat Johann SANITZER

b. Search-Group:

- ✓ 1) Kriminalsekretär Anton BROEDL: born about 1905, 178 cm. tall; slender; rigid posture; brown hair; light brown eyes; sharp nose; marked features; clean-shave.
- ✓ 2) Kriminalsekretär Josef WIMMER
- ✓ 3) Kriminaloberassistent Johann BECHER
- ✓ 4) Kriminalangestellter Hans OFFENBECK

c. Interrogation Group:

- ✓ 1) Kriminalsekretär Wilhelm WEISS
- ✓ 2) Kriminalsekretär Johann HEINDL
- ✓ 3) Kriminalsekretär Johann GUTNER

d. Funkspiel Gruppe: (Radio Play-Back Group):

1) Radio operators:

- ✓ a) Kriminalobersekretär Karl HAAS
- ✓ b) Polizeisekretär MUELLNER, fm

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- ✓ c) Revierhauptwachmeister Karl KROMES
- ✓ d) Revierhauptwachmeister STOCKINGER, fmu

2) Cryptanalysis Personnel:

- ✓ a) Ing. Karl LANGER
- ✓ b) Kriminalsekretär BARTL
- ✓ c) Kriminalsekretär GETTINGER
- ✓ d) Kriegedienstverpflichteter Boris TSCAUTOW (Russian interpreter)

3) Services Personnel:

- ✓ a) POENTNER, fmu, (driver)
- ✓ b) FISCHER, Waffen SS (guard)
- ✓ c) POSCH, fmu, Waffen SS (guard)
- ✓ d) PFELFFER, Franziska, SANITZER's housekeeper and mistress of UNTERHAUSEN, Soviet agent.

✓ e. Hauptmann Hannes BAUER:

Commanding Officer, OKG Funkabwehrungsstelle Sued-Ost, located at Vienna XIII, Marxingstrasse; expert on Allied cipher systems. Born about 1905, 178 cm. height; athletic build; dark blond hair, brushed back; wide face; handsome. Traces: Various British reports mention one Oberleutnant, later Hauptmann, Hanns BAUER, who in 1944-45 was a radio expert attached to RSHA/VI in Athens Greece. He was very successful in the interception of British radio agent traffic in Greece.

✓ f. Polizeihauptmann GEOTTE:

Commanding officer, Polizei Funkwache Vienna. Markkennzeichen; expert on Allied radio techniques. Born ca. 1910, 175 cm. tall; slender, narrow face; dark blond hair, brushed back; protruding, large ears; large mole on left temple.

✓ g. BERGER, fmu:

Kommunistenreferent of the Stapo Stelle, Vienna; later head of Stapo Stelle Klagenfurt.

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b. LAENDER, fru:

According to Lt. Jack TAYLOR of the OSS DUPONT Mission, he was a Feldwebel, wearing civilian clothes, who "handled double agent W/T traffic" at Gestapo HQ, Morzinplatz, Vienna. Viennese, former construction engineer; was with German Army in Paris until liberation; married French woman.

i. Dr. MEYER:

Head of Gerichtsmedizinisches Institut at University of Vienna. Collaborated with SANITZER in scientific examination of captured enemy equipment.

10. In addition to the above names contained in LSI-33 which are of interest to us, you will note that Dr. Napoleon BICHARY of Prinz Eugenstr. 2, Vienna IV, is mentioned as the individual whose name was given the Soviet agents by their case officers as a useful legal contact. BICHARY is obviously identical with the individual of the same name who has appeared in the FOND XI case: FOND XI and ESTERHAZY contacted BICHARY in an attempt to gain the release of ESTERHAZY's child from Soviet custody; DE KORANYI was also in contact with BICHARY concerning the release of Hans von MAUTNER from the Soviets.

11. Appendix B, para. 1 of LSI-33 mentions one DOBETZBERGER, former member of the "Schutzbund", husband of a Red Army Major, and residing in Floridsdorf, Vienna, during the last war. It does not seem possible that this DOBETZBERGER is identical with Professor Josef DOBETZBERGER known to you. However, the matter should be checked.

12. LSI-33 is sadly lacking in technical information on the actual operational methods of the Soviets. Some of this is supplemented by the captured documents, in which the recruitment, training and dispatch of the individual agents is fairly well covered. However, since the documents are only the preliminary interrogations of the individual agents, they do not provide us with details on the actual play-back operations nor on the agents themselves. As you will note there are no physical descriptions. More important, there is no indication of the ultimate fate of the agents. For example the agent UNBEHAUEN of "Funkspiel THEISS" is quoted as saying that as soon as he was through with his mission in Austria he was to return and undertake a mission for the Soviets against the Americans. That brief bit of intelligence is not elaborated. The only possible lead which could be used in tracking down UNBEHAUEN would be Franziska PFELTNER, cook and housekeeper for Section IV2b, who was also UNBEHAUEN's mistress. The last statement on UNBEHAUEN in LSI-33 reported the two still together.

13. The captured documents make it appear that the teams of SVOBODA/GINSTL and RINAGEL/MATUSCHEK were dispatched by the Soviet military intelligence or GRU. Hildegard RIESS definitely stated that she was recruited by the NKVD. KERSCHER/SOUCEK/MRAZ apparently were recruited and trained by the "Comintern". SANITZER commented, pages 7 and 8 of LSI-33 that the Comintern team was badly equipped as compared to

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15. The information contained in the attached appendices should not be passed to GREENGROVER/1 until you are certain that he has given you an adequate accounting of his own and the British interest in the case. If GREENGROVER/1 has the SANITZER files the attached will probably add little except to confirm the success of SANITZER's methods; through surveillance based on the files of the "Schutzbund Kinder", Austrian Communists and their families, etc., he was able to identify an agent when the latter appeared in Austria. If he does not have the files the attached should be of considerable value for GREENGROVER/1. When you have notified us of the outcome of your preliminary conversations with G/1, we will consider passing to him in sanitized form the information contained in the captured documents.

Attachments:

cc. Kar Isruha

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